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Abstract
We study the problem of choosing prize winners from among a group of experts
when each expert nominates another expert for the prize. A nomination rule determines
the set of winners on the basis of the prole of nominations; the rule is impartial if
one's nomination never inuences one's own chance of winning the prize. In this paper,
we consider impartial, anonymous, symmetric, and monotonic nomination rules and
characterize the set of all minimal such ones. We show that the set consists of exactly
one nomination rule: a natural variant of the plurality correspondence called plurality
with runners-up.
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1 Introduction
Suppose that a foundation is considering awarding a prize to one or more members of
a group of experts whose activities advance the public interest. The foundation's leader
wishes to select people who truly deserve the prize, but he cannot do so by himself because
he lacks the expertise needed to evaluate their merits. Given that situation, this paper
considers the design of award rules that base the selection of winners on experts' views. In
particular, we study nomination rules that ask each expert to nominate one other expert
for the prize; the set of winners is then determined based on the prole of nominations. The
challenge of this approach is that certain nomination rules might create conicts of interest
among \selsh" experts. In particular, a person caring only about her own winning might
corrupt her nomination if there is a chance that she can inuence her own likelihood of
receiving the prize. We are thus interested in nomination rules that create no such conict
of interest, and study those satisfying an axiom called impartiality. Impartiality requires
that whether one wins the prize should be independent of one's nomination; a selsh person
thus has no chance to inuence her own winning whenever the rule is impartial.
The aim of this paper is to identify reasonable impartial nomination rules among those
satisfying three axioms: anonymity, symmetry, and monotonicity. Anonymity requires
that an exchange of nominations between two people should not aect any other person's
winning. Symmetry requires the determination of the set of winners to be independent of
the indexes of people. Monotonicity requires any subset of winners to be included in the
new set of winners when they each obtain an additional nomination from another person.
Now, consider the nomination rule under which all people are always chosen as win-
ners. Although satisfying the three axioms and being impartial, we cannot describe such a
nomination rule as reasonable. By always selecting too many winners, without examining
their qualications, it might degrade the prestige of the prize, which the foundation aims
to maintain. It might also undermine the social practice of competition. These arguments
conrm that it is desirable for a nomination rule to select winners as strictly as possible,
leading us to the question of which nomination rules are optimal in this sense subject to
all the four axioms.
In this paper, we obtain an explicit answer to that question by exploring minimal
nomination rules among those satisfying the four axioms. We dene a nomination rule
satisfying the four axioms as \minimal" if one cannot make a further renement to the
nomination rule while still preserving the four axioms, that is, if no other nomination rule
satises the four axioms while assigning to every prole of nominations a set of winners
that is smaller, measured by inclusion, than that assigned by the nomination rule under
consideration. The result will thus characterize the set of all minimal nomination rules
satisfying the four axioms. We show that plurality with runners-up (Tamura and Ohseto,
2014) is the only minimal nomination rule satisfying impartiality, anonymity, symmetry,
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and monotonicity. Plurality with runners-up is a natural variant of the ordinary plurality
correspondence. Indeed, the set of winners is always that of plurality winners except when
there is a sole plurality winner who defeats the runners-up by only one point; in that case,
a runner-up also wins if she nominates the sole plurality winner.
This paper is the rst, to our knowledge, to establish a characterization result in the
context of impartial nomination rules. Holzman and Moulin (2013) begin this area of
study with \single-valued" nomination rules and propose interesting impartial rules dubbed
partition methods. Instead of characterizing these partition methods, they establish two
impossibility results regarding single-valued impartial nomination rules; one of these states
that no such rule simultaneously satises two axioms that they call positive unanimity and
negative unanimity.1 Tamura and Ohseto (2014) then allow rules to be \multi-valued,"
as is done in our paper, and focus on the discussion of whether Holzman and Moulin's
impossibility results hold in a more general class of multi-valued nomination rules. By
constructing the \plurality with runners-up" correspondence, they show the existence of
an impartial rule meeting positive and negative unanimity when at least four people are
involved.
In the closely related context of \impartial division rules," a characterization result has
already been established. de Clippel et al. (2008) study the problem of dividing a surplus
among a group of partners when each partner represents her subjective opinion about the
relative contributions of the others to the surplus. A division rule determines the division
of the surplus on the basis of the prole of opinions, and impartiality requires the share of
the surplus each person receives to be independent of her opinion. Among four or more
partners, the authors propose an innite family of impartial division rules that aggregate
the opinions of all partners in a highly natural way. They then characterize that family by
employing several reasonable axioms. A clear dierence exists between de Clippel et al.'s
result and ours: they characterize the whole class of rules meeting their axioms, whereas
we characterize only the minimal rules satisfying our axioms. Nevertheless, this dierence
does not degrade the importance of our result; as explained above, in our context, the
investigation of minimal nomination rules is itself meaningful.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model
and axioms. In Section 3, we state and prove the result. In Section 4, we oer concluding
remarks. Some proofs are gathered in Appendix.
2 Model and Axioms
Let N = f1; : : : ; ng (n  3) be the set of people. For each i 2 N , let xi 2 N n fig denote
person i's nomination. If xi = j, it means that i nominates j. A list x = (xi)i2N is called a
1Positive unanimity says that a person should (uniquely) win if she is nominated by everybody else.
Negative unanimity says that a person should not win if she is not nominated by anybody.
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nomination prole. Let NN  denote the set of all nomination proles. For each x 2 NN  and
each i1; : : : ; im 2 N , where m = 1; : : : ; n, we sometimes write x for (xfi1;:::;img; xNnfi1;:::;img)
for distinguishing the nominations of persons i1; : : : ; im from those of the others in x. For
simplicity of notation, we often use (xi; x i) instead of (xfig; xNnfig). A nomination rule
is a correspondence ' : NN  ! 2N n f;g that assigns a non-empty subset of people, which
we mention as the set of winners, to each nomination prole.
We next introduce four axioms that we impose on nomination rules. First, as our
central axiom, impartiality says that each person's winning should be independent of her
nomination.
Impartiality: for all x 2 NN  , all i 2 N , and all x0i 2 N n fig,
i 2 '(xi; x i), i 2 '(x0i; x i):
Second, we introduce an axiom of anonymity that ensures people to be treated equally
as \voters." Suppose that two people, say, j; k, exchange their nominations each other.
Anonymity says that this exchange should not aect the winning of any other person, say,
i, so that j and k have the same inuence on i's winning.2
Anonymity: for all x 2 NN  , all i 2 N , all j; k 2 N n fig, all x0j 2 N n fjg, and all
x0k 2 N n fkg,
if x0j = xk 6= j; and x0k = xj 6= k;
then i 2 '(xfj;kg; xNnfj;kg), i 2 '(x0fj;kg; xNnfj;kg):
Third, we introduce an axiom of symmetry that ensures people to be treated symmet-
rically as \candidates."3 Let  : N ! N be a permutation of N . The set of all such
permutations is denoted by N . For any  2 N and any x 2 NN  , let x denote the
nomination prole such that xi = (x 1(i)) for all i 2 N . Note that x(i) = (xi) for any
i 2 N , which describes how  transforms x into x: if i nominates j in x, (i) nominates
(j) in x. Symmetry says that (i) should be one of the winners in x whenever i is in x.
Symmetry: for all  2 N , all x 2 NN  , and all i 2 N ,
i 2 '(x), (i) 2 '(x):
2Anonymity is then weaker than the axiom called anonymous ballots, requiring that a nomination rule
should depend only on the number of nominations each person receives. For consequences of anonymous
ballots for impartial nomination rules, see Holzman and Moulin (2013) and Tamura and Ohseto (2014).
3Our formulation is done in reference to Holzman and Moulin (2013), who dene symmetry for ran-
domized single-valued nomination rules, i.e., functions that assign to each nomination prole the winning
probabilities of persons.
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Finally, we introduce an axiom of monotonicity that imposes a certain consistency
requirement on nomination rules. Monotonicity says that any subset of winners should be
included in the new set of winners when they each obtain an additional nomination from
another person.
Monotonicity: for all x 2 NN  , all i1; : : : ; im 2 N , all j1; : : : ; jm 2 N , all x0j1 2 N n
fj1g; : : :, and all x0jm 2 N n fjmg,
if fi1; : : : ; img  '(x);
xj1 ; : : : ; xjm =2 fi1; : : : ; img; and
x0j1 = i1; : : : ; x
0
jm = im;
then fi1; : : : ; img  '(x0fj1;:::;jmg; xNnfj1;:::;jmg):
Let  denote the set of all nomination rules satisfying impartiality, anonymity, sym-
metry, and monotonicity. We say that a nomination rule ' 2  is minimal if there is no
'0 2  such that '0 6= ' and '0(x)  '(x) for all x 2 NN  .
3 Characterization result
In this section, we show that plurality with runners-up (Tamura and Ohseto, 2014) is the
only minimal nomination rule that belongs to . To introduce the denition of plurality
with runners-up, we give some additional notations. Given x 2 NN  and i 2 N , let
si(x) = jfj 2 N n fig : xj = igj denote person i's score in x. Given x 2 NN  , let sF (x) =
maxi2N si(x) and Fx = fi 2 N : si(x) = sF (x)g denote the (rst) highest score and the
set of people obtaining that score in x, respectively. Similarly, let sS(x) = maxi2NnFx si(x)
and Sx = fi 2 N : si(x) = sS(x)g denote the second highest score and the set of people
obtaining that score in x, respectively.
Denition 1 (Tamura and Ohseto, 2014). A nomination rule ' is plurality with runners-
up if, for all x 2 NN  ,
(a) if jFxj = 1 and sF (x)  sS(x) = 1, then '(x) = Fx [ fi 2 Sx : xi 2 Fxg;
(b) else, '(x) = Fx.
In words, plurality with runners-up is the nomination rule such that, not only do the
plurality winners always win, but also a runner-up wins if she nominates the sole plurality
winner who defeats the runner-up by only one point.
Before we state and prove the result, it should be noted that plurality with runners-up
' is not the unique nomination rule that belongs to . Indeed, for instance, the indier-
ence rule, dened by 'ind(x) = N for all x 2 NN  , also satises impartiality, anonymity,
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symmetry, and monotonicity. But we have '(x)  'ind(x) for all x 2 NN  , which is
consistent with the claim that ' is the only minimal nomination rule that belongs to .
We show that plurality with runners-up is the only minimal nomination rule satisfying
impartiality, anonymity, symmetry, and monotonicity.
Theorem 1. Plurality with runners-up is the only minimal nomination rule satisfying
impartiality, anonymity, symmetry, and monotonicity.
Proof. Let ' be the plurality with runners-up as in Denition 1. First of all, we must
verify that ' actually satises each of the four axioms.
Impartiality Here we propose an alternative verication that would be more intuitive than
the one established in Tamura and Ohseto (2014). We note that, for all x 2 NN  and all
i 2 N , we have i 2 '(x) , i 2 Fx i , where Fx i denotes the set of people obtaining the
rst highest score in x provided that i's nomination is not counted.4 Hence, since Fx i is
independent of i's nomination, ' satises impartiality.
Anonymity For all x 2 NN  , all i 2 N , all j; k 2 Nnfig, all x0j 2 Nnfjg, and all x0k 2 Nnfkg,
suppose that i 2 '(x), x0j = xk 6= j, and x0k = xj 6= k. Let x0 = (x0fj;kg; xNnfj;kg). If i 2 Fx,
then i 2 Fx0 , and thus i 2 '(x0). If i 2 Sx, we have jFxj = 1, sF (x)   sS(x) = 1, and
xi 2 Fx. Then, we have i 2 Sx0 , jFx0 j = 1, sF (x0)   sS(x0) = 1, and x0i = xi 2 Fx0 .
Therefore, we obtain i 2 '(x0).
Symmetry For all  2 N , all x 2 NN  , and all i 2 N , suppose that i 2 '(x). Note
that s(j)(x
) = sj(x) for any j 2 N . Therefore, if i 2 Fx, we have (i) 2 Fx , and thus
(i) 2 '(x). If i 2 Sx, we have jFxj = 1, sF (x)  sS(x) = 1, and xi 2 Fx, implying that
(i) 2 Sx , jFx j = 1, sF (x)   sS(x) = 1, and x(i) = (xi) 2 Fx . Hence, we obtain
(i) 2 '(x).
Monotonicity For all x 2 NN  , all i1; : : : ; im 2 N , all j1; : : : ; jm 2 N , all x0j1 2 N nfj1g; : : :,
and all x0jm 2 N n fjmg, suppose that fi1; : : : ; img  '(x), xj1 ; : : : ; xjm =2 fi1; : : : ; img,
and x0j1 = i1; : : : ; x
0
jm
= im. Let x
0 = (x0fj1;:::;jmg; xNnfj1;:::;jmg). We now distinguish
three possible cases: (i) jFxj > 1; (ii) jFxj = 1 and m = 1; (iii) jFxj = 1 and m > 1.
If jFxj > 1, we have fi1; : : : ; img  Fx. Then, we have fi1; : : : ; img  Fx0 . Therefore,
fi1; : : : ; img  '(x0). If jFxj = 1 and m = 1, we have either i1 2 Fx or i1 2 Sx with
sF (x)   sS(x) = 1. Then, in either of the two cases, we have i1 2 Fx0 . Therefore,
fi1g  '(x0). If jFxj = 1 and m > 1, we have sF (x)   sS(x) = 1. Without loss
of generality, assume that i2; : : : ; im 2 Sx, so we have xi2 ; : : : ; xim 2 Fx. If i1 2 Fx,
then, we have Fx0 = fi1g, i2; : : : ; im 2 Sx0 , and sF (x0)   sS(x0) = 1. Moreover, since
4A formal denition of Fx i will be as follows. For each x 2 NN  , each i 2 N , and each j 2 N , dene
sj(x i) = jfk 2 N n fi; jg : xk = jgj, and then, dene Fx i = fj 2 N : sj(x i) = maxk2N sk(x i)g. Notice
that si(x i) = si(x) for any x 2 NN  and any i 2 N .
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xj1 ; : : : ; xjm =2 fi1g and xi2 = : : : = xim = i1, we have i2; : : : ; im =2 fj1; : : : ; jmg, implying
that x0i2 = : : : = x
0
im
= i1. Hence, we obtain fi1; : : : ; img  '(x0). If i1 2 Sx, then, since
sF (x)  sS(x) = 1, we have fi1; : : : ; img  Fx0 . Therefore, we obtain fi1; : : : ; img  '(x0).
We now turn to prove that ' is the only minimal nomination rule satisfying the four
axioms. Note that this is equivalent to proving that no other nomination rule satisfying
the four axioms is minimal, which is, after all, equivalent to showing that, for any ' 2 ,
we have '(x)  '(x) for all x 2 NN  . Here we prove the last statement in two steps: we
rst show that Fx  '(x) for all x 2 NN  ; and second show that fi 2 Sx : xi 2 Fxg  '(x)
whenever x 2 NN  is such that jFxj = 1 and sF (x)  sS(x) = 1.
Step 1. Fx  '(x) for all x 2 NN  .
This is shown by induction on sF (x), the rst highest score in x 2 NN  . First, let x 2 NN  be
such that sF (x) = 1. Note that Fx = N . Now, suppose that, for the sake of contradiction,
we have i =2 '(x) for some i 2 Fx. Without loss of generality, assume that 1 =2 '(x) and
x1 = 2. Consider x
0 2 NN  such that x0j = j + 1 for all j = 1; : : : ; n   1 and x0n = 1.
Then, since sj(x
0) = sj(x) = 1 for all j 2 N and x01 = x1, anonymity implies that
1 =2 '(x0). Consider  2 N such that (j) = x0j for all j 2 N . Note that (x0) = x0.
Then, symmetry implies that [1 =2 '(x0) ) 2 =2 '(x0)]; [2 =2 '(x0) ) 3 =2 '(x0)]; : : : ; and
[n  1 =2 '(x0)) n =2 '(x0)]. Thus, we have '(x0) = ;, a contradiction.
Next, for all r = 2; : : : ; n   1, assume that Fx  '(x) whenever x 2 NN  is such that
sF (x) = r   1 (induction hypothesis). Let x 2 NN  be such that sF (x) = r. We show
that Fx  '(x). Suppose that jFxj = m and Fx = fi1; : : : ; img, where 1  m  n=2.
Let Hx = fh 2 N : sh(x) = 0g denote the set of people not obtaining any nomination
from others in x. Note that, since sF (x) = r  2, we have jHxj  m. Now, suppose
that there exist j1; : : : ; jm 2 N and h1; : : : ; hm 2 Hx such that xj1 = i1; : : : ; xjm = im and
j1 6= h1; : : : ; jm 6= hm. Consider x0 2 NN  such that x0j1 = h1; : : : ; x0jm = hm and x0i = xi for
all i 2 N n fj1; : : : ; jmg. Then, we have fi1; : : : ; img  Fx0 and sF (x0) = r   1. Therefore,
induction hypothesis implies that fi1; : : : ; img  '(x0). Hence, by monotonicity, we obtain
Fx = fi1; : : : ; img  '(x). It remains to check that there always exist such j1; : : : ; jm 2 N
and h1; : : : ; hm 2 Hx. We distinguish two possible cases, namely, jHxj = 1 and jHxj > 1.
Case 1. jHxj = 1.
Since jHxj  m, we have m = 1. Let h1 2 Hx. Since si1(x) = r  2, there must be j1 2 N
such that xj1 = i1 and j1 6= h1.
Case 2. jHxj > 1.
Since sF (x) = r  2 > 0, there exist j1; : : : ; jm 2 N such that xj1 = i1; : : : ; xjm = im.
We now choose h1; : : : ; hm 2 Hx so that j1 6= h1; : : : ; jm 6= hm. If m = 1, since jHxj > 1,
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there must be h1 2 Hx such that j1 6= h1. If m > 1, we further distinguish three subcases
with respect to the number of members in fj1; : : : ; jmg \Hx. Let jfj1; : : : ; jmg \Hxj = l.
If l = 0, no diculty arises in our choice problem; for any way of choosing h1; : : : ; hm 2
Hx, we obtain j1 6= h1; : : : ; jm 6= hm. If l  1, without loss of generality, assume that
j1; : : : ; jl 2 fj1; : : : ; jmg \ Hx. If l = 1, let hm = j1, and choose h1; : : : ; hm 1 arbitrarily
from among Hx n fhmg. Then, since m > 1, we obtain j1 6= h1; : : : ; jm 6= hm. If l > 1,
let h1 = j2; : : : ; hl 1 = jl, and hl = j1, and choose hl+1; : : : ; hm (if l < m) arbitrarily from
among Hx n fh1; : : : ; hlg. Then, we obtain j1 6= h1; : : : ; jm 6= hm.
Step 2. fi 2 Sx : xi 2 Fxg  '(x) if jFxj = 1 and sF (x)  sS(x) = 1.
Let x 2 NN  be such that jFxj = 1 and sF (x)  sS(x) = 1. Let i 2 Sx with xi 2 Fx. Note
that, since jFxj = 1, we have sF (x)  2. Then, there exists h 2 N n (Fx [ Sx) such that
sh(x) = 0. Let x
0
i = h. Then, since jFxj = 1, i 2 Sx, sF (x)   sS(x) = 1, and xi 2 Fx,
we have i 2 F(x0i;x i). Therefore, by Step 1, we have i 2 F(x0i;x i)  '(x0i; x i). Hence, by
impartiality, we obtain i 2 '(x).
We check that the four axioms in Theorem 1 are needed for its statement. We show
that, if we drop each of the four axioms, there exists another nomination rule ' that
satises all the other axioms and that '(x) 6 '(x) for some x 2 NN  . All the verications
we omit here are established in Appendix.
Example 1 (Dropping impartiality). The plurality correspondence, dened by '(x) = Fx
for all x 2 NN  , satises anonymity, symmetry, and monotonicity, but not impartiality.
Example 2 (Dropping anonymity). Suppose n  4. Consider the following subcorrespon-
dence ' of the plurality with runners-up: for all x 2 NN  ,
Case A: if jFxj > 1; and
(i) if sF (x) > 1; then '(x) = Fx;
(ii) if sF (x) = 1 and jfi 2 Fx : 9i0 2 N n fig; xi0 = i and xi = i0gj = n; then '(x) = Fx;
(iii) if sF (x) = 1 and jfi 2 Fx : 9i0 2 N n fig; xi0 = i and xi = i0gj < n; then '(x) = F x ;
where F x = fi 2 Fx : 9j; k 2 N n fig; xj = i and xk = jg;
Case B: if jFxj = 1; sF (x)  sS(x) = 1; and
(i) if sF (x) > 2; then '(x) = Fx [ fi 2 Sx : xi 2 Fxg;
(ii) if sF (x) = 2 and jfi 2 Sx : 9i0 2 N n fig; xi0 = i and xi = i0gj = n  3;
then '(x) = Fx [ fi 2 Sx : xi 2 Fxg;
(iii) if sF (x) = 2 and jfi 2 Sx : 9i0 2 N n fig; xi0 = i and xi = i0gj < n  3;
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then '(x) = Fx [ fi 2 Sx : xi 2 Fxg;
where Sx = fi 2 Sx : 9j; k 2 N n fig; xj = i and xk = jg;
Case C: if jFxj = 1 and sF (x)  sS(x) > 1; then '(x) = Fx:
This subcorrespondence satises impartiality, symmetry, and monotonicity, but not anonymity
if n  5.
Example 3 (Dropping symmetry). We introduce a subcorrespondence ' of the plurality
with runners-up mentioned in Tamura and Ohseto (2014). Fix an order on N . For any
x 2 NN  , the person i being the rst member of Fx always wins, and there are two special
cases in which there is one additional winner j 6= i: (i) if jFxj > 1, i 2 Fx, and j is the
second member of Fx with xj = i, then '(x) = fi; jg; (ii) if jFxj = 1, i 2 Fx, and j is the
rst member of Sx with si(x) sj(x) = 1, xj = i, and j precedes i, then '(x) = fi; jg. This
subcorrespondence satises impartiality, anonymity, and monotonicity, but not symmetry.
Example 4 (Dropping monotonicity). Let ' be such that, for all x 2 NN  ,
(a) if sF (x) = n  1, then '(x) = fi 2 N : si(x) = 1g;
(b) else, '(x) = fi 2 N : si(x)  1g.
This nomination rule satises impartiality, anonymity, and symmetry, but not monotonic-
ity.
We have seen in Example 2 that anonymity is necessary for Theorem 1 whenever n  5.
This is, however, no longer true if n  4 since, in that case, we can establish the result
without assuming anonymity. To see this, it suces to show that symmetry implies that
'(x) = Fx = N whenever sF (x) = 1. Let x 2 NN  be such that sF (x) = 1. First, consider
the case of n = 3. Then, there always exist i1; i2; i3 2 N such that xi1 = i2, xi2 = i3, and
xi3 = i1. Consider  2 N such that (i) = xi. Then, since x = x, symmetry implies
that '(x) = fi1; i2; i3g. Second, consider the case of n = 4. In this case, we distinguish
the following two subcases: (i) 9i1; i2; i3; i4 2 N such that xi1 = i2, xi2 = i3, xi3 = i4, and
xi4 = i1; (ii) 9i1; i2; j1; j2 2 N such that xi1 = i2, xi2 = i1, xj1 = j2, and xj2 = j1. If (i),
then by the same argument as with the case of n = 3, we obtain '(x) = fi1; i2; i3; i4g. If
(ii), consider  2 N such that (i1) = i2, (i2) = i1, (j1) = j2, and (j2) = j1. Then, we
have x = x. Therefore, symmetry implies that we have fi1; i2g  '(x) or fj1; j2g  '(x)
(or both). On the other hand, consider 0 2 N such that 0(i1) = j1, 0(i2) = j2,
0(j1) = i1, and 0(j2) = i2. Then, we have x
0
= x. Therefore, symmetry implies that we
have fi1; j1g  '(x) or fi2; j2g  '(x) (or both). Hence, we obtain '(x) = fi1; i2; j1; j2g.
4 Concluding remarks
We showed that plurality with runners-up is the only minimal nomination rule satisfying
impartiality, anonymity, symmetry, and monotonicity. It would be fair to say that our
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three axioms, as well as impartiality, are desirable properties in practical situations. Then,
our result suggests that plurality with runners-up is a reasonable impartial nomination rule
to use in such situations. Moreover, as we have seen in the proof of Theorem 1, the rule
becomes simple enough for practical use if it is represented as follows: a person wins if and
only if she is one of the plurality winners when her nomination is omitted.
Given our result, one may wonder if one can establish a complete characterization of
the plurality with runners-up, that is, whether one can nd a set of axioms that deduces
the rule. In regard to this, we currently know that, if n = 4, then plurality with runners-up
is the unique nomination rule satisfying impartiality, symmetry, and positive and negative
unanimity mentioned in the introduction.5 However, we have not seen any such character-
ization if n  5, so we leave this topic for future research.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we verify that each of the four examples introduced above actually satises
the corresponding three axioms but not the one, as stated there.
Example 1 Let ' be as in Example 1. We show that ' satises anonymity, symmetry,
and monotonicity, but not impartiality.
Anonymity Obvious.
Symmetry Obvious.
Monotonicity Obvious.
Non-impartiality Consider a nomination prole x 2 NN  such that sF (x) = 1. Then,
we have '(x) = N . Now, let x0i 6= xi for some i 2 N . Then, we have F(x0i;x i) = fx0ig.
Therefore, we have i =2 '(x0i; x i), violating impartiality.
Example 2 Let ' be as in Example 2. We show that ' satises impartiality, symmetry,
monotonicity, but not anonymity if n  5.
Impartiality For all x 2 NN  and all i 2 N , suppose that i 2 '(x). Let x0i 6= xi. For
simplicity of notation, let x0 = (x0i; x i). Now, we distinguish three cases of A, B, and C,
as in the denition of '.
Case A. jFxj > 1.
Then, we have i 2 Fx. We further distinguish three subcases as in the denition of '.
(i) sF (x) > 1. If x
0
i 2 Fxnfig, then i 2 Sx0 , Fx0 = fx0ig, sF (x0) sS(x0) = 1, and sF (x0) > 2.
Therefore, we obtain i 2 '(x0). If x0i =2 Fx, then i 2 Fx0 , implying that sF (x0) = sF (x) > 1.
Therefore, i 2 '(x0).
(ii) sF (x) = 1 and jfi 2 Fx : 9i0 2 N nfig; xi0 = i and xi = i0gj = n. Then, there (uniquely)
exists i0 2 N n fig such that xi0 = i and xi = i0. Suppose x0i = j for some j 2 N n fi; i0g.
Note that, since jfi 2 Fx : 9i0 2 N n fig; xi0 = i and xi = i0gj = n and xi = i0 6= j, we have
xj 6= i; i0. Now, since sF (x) = 1, we have i 2 Sx0 , Fx0 = fx0ig = fjg, sF (x0)   sS(x0) = 1,
and sF (x
0) = sj(x0) = 2. Moreover, since jfi 2 Fx : 9i0 2 N n fig; xi0 = i and xi = i0gj = n,
Sx0 = Fx n fi0; jg = N n fi0; jg, x0i = j, and x0j = xj 6= i; i0, we have jfi 2 Sx0 : 9i0 2
N n fig; x0i0 = i and x0i = i0gj = n  3. Therefore, we obtain i 2 '(x0).
(iii) sF (x) = 1 and jfi 2 Fx : 9i0 2 N n fig; xi0 = i and xi = i0gj < n. Then, there exist
j; k 2 N n fig such that xj = i and xk = j. Now, for any x0i 6= xi, since sF (x) = 1, we
have i 2 Sx0 , Fx0 = fx0ig, sF (x0)  sS(x0) = 1, and sF (x0) = 2. Therefore, since x0j = xj = i
and x0k = xk = j, regardless of jfi 2 Sx0 : 9i0 2 N n fig; x0i0 = i and x0i = i0gj, we obtain
i 2 '(x0).
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Case B. jFxj = 1 and sF (x)  sS(x) = 1.
First, consider the case that i 2 Fx. Note that, since jFxj = 1, we have sF (x)  2. Now,
for any x0i 6= xi, since Fx = fig, we have i 2 Fx0 . Therefore, sF (x0) = sF (x)  2. Hence,
regardless of jFx0 j, we obtain i 2 '(x0).
Next, consider the case that i 2 Sx. Then, we have xi 2 Fx. Now, we distinguish three
subcases as in the denition of '.
(i) sF (x) > 2. Since Fx = fxig and sF (x)  sS(x) = 1, we have either i 2 Fx0 (if x0i =2 Sx)
or i 2 Sx0 with sF (x0)  sS(x0) = 1 (if x0i 2 Sx n fig). If i 2 Fx0 , then, since sF (x) > 2, we
have sF (x
0)  2. Therefore, regardless of jFx0 j, we obtain i 2 '(x0). If i 2 Sx0 , then, since
Fx0 = fx0ig, x0i 2 Sx n fig, and sF (x)  sS(x) = 1, we have sF (x0) = sF (x) > 2. Therefore,
we obtain i 2 '(x0).
(ii) sF (x) = 2 and jfi 2 Sx : 9i0 2 N n fig; xi0 = i and xi = i0gj = n  3. Suppose Fx = fjg
for some j 2 N n fig. Note that, since sF (x) = sj(x) = 2 and xi = j, there uniquely exists
k 2 N n fi; jg such that xk = j. Note also that we have the following two cases: (a) i 2 Fx0
with sF (x
0) = 1 (if x0i =2 Sx, namely, x0i = h for unique h 2 N n fig such that sh(x) = 0);
(b) i 2 Sx0 with Fx0 = fx0ig, sF (x0)   sS(x0) = 1, and sF (x0) = 2 (if x0i 2 Sx n fig). Then,
if xj = i, since xk = j, we obtain i 2 '(x0) in either of the two cases. If xj 6= i, then, since
xi = j, jfi 2 Sx : 9i0 2 N n fig; xi0 = i and xi = i0gj = n  3, and Sx = N n fh; jg, we have
fi 2 Sx : 9i0 2 N n fig; xi0 = i and xi = i0g = Sx n fig, which, since sS(x) = 1, implies that
xh = i, and thus, k 2 Sx and xj = k (remember xk = j). Therefore, if (b), since jfi 2 Sx :
9i0 2 N n fig; xi0 = i and xi = i0gj = n  3, Sx0 = (Sx n fx0ig)[ fjg, xk = j, and xj = k, we
have jfi 2 Sx0 : 9i0 2 N n fig; x0i0 = i and x0i = i0gj = n   3. Hence, we obtain i 2 '(x0).
If (a), since fi 2 Sx : 9i0 2 N n fig; xi0 = i and xi = i0g = Sx n fig = N n fh; i; jg, x0i = h,
xh = i, xj = k, and xk = j, we have jfi 2 Fx0 : 9i0 2 N n fig; x0i0 = i and x0i = i0gj = n.
Therefore, we obtain i 2 '(x0).
(iii) sF (x) = 2 and jfi 2 Sx : 9i0 2 N n fig; xi0 = i and xi = i0gj < n  3. Then, there exist
j; k 2 N n fig such that xj = i and xk = j. Now, since Fx = fxig, sF (x)  sS(x) = 1, and
sF (x) = 2, we have either i 2 Fx0 with sF (x0) = 1 (if x0i =2 Sx) or i 2 Sx0 with Fx0 = fx0ig,
sF (x
0)   sS(x0) = 1, and sF (x0) = 2 (if x0i 2 Sx n fig). Therefore, since x0j = xj = i and
x0k = xk = j, we obtain i 2 '(x0) in either of the two cases.
Case C. jFxj = 1 and sF (x)  sS(x) > 1.
Then, we have i 2 Fx. Note that, since Fx = fig and sF (x)  sS(x) > 1, we have Fx0 = fig
whatever x0i 6= xi is. Hence, we obtain i 2 '(x0).
Symmetry One can verify this samely as with the case for the plurality with runners-up
if taking care of the following two simple facts: (i) for any  2 N , any x 2 NN  , and any
i; i0 2 N , we have x(i0) = (i) and x(i) = (i0) whenever xi0 = i and xi = i0; (ii) for any
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 2 N , any x 2 NN  , and any i; j; k 2 N , we have x(j) = (i) and x(k) = (j) whenever
xj = i and xk = j.
Monotonicity For all x 2 NN  , all i1; : : : ; im 2 N , all j1; : : : ; jm 2 N , all x0j1 2 N nfj1g; : : :,
and all x0jm 2 N n fjmg, suppose that fi1; : : : ; img  '(x), xj1 ; : : : ; xjm =2 fi1; : : : ; img,
and x0j1 = i1; : : : ; x
0
jm
= im. Let x
0 = (x0fj1;:::;jmg; xNnfj1;:::;jmg). If jFxj > 1, we havefi1; : : : ; img  Fx, and thus fi1; : : : ; img  Fx0 . Moreover, since sF (x)  1, we have
sF (x
0) > 1. Hence, we obtain fi1; : : : ; img  '(x0). If jFxj = 1, note that sF (x)  2.
Now, we distinguish two cases, namely, m = 1 and m > 1. If m = 1, we have either
i1 2 Fx or i1 2 Sx with sF (x)   sS(x) = 1. Then, in either of the two cases, we have
i1 2 Fx0 , which, since sF (x)  2, implies that sF (x0)  2. Therefore, regardless of jFx0 j,
we obtain i1 2 '(x0). If m > 1, assume without loss of generality that i2; : : : ; im 2 Sx,
so we have xi2 ; : : : ; xim 2 Fx. If i1 2 Fx, then, we have Fx0 = fi1g, i2; : : : ; im 2 Sx0 ,
and sF (x
0)   sS(x0) = 1. Moreover, since sF (x)  2, we have sF (x0) > 2. On the other
hand, since xi2 = : : : = xim = i1, we have x
0
i2
= : : : = x0im = i1. Hence, we obtain
fi1; : : : ; img  '(x0). If i1 2 Sx, then, since sF (x)   sS(x) = 1 and sF (x)  2, we have
fi1; : : : ; img  Fx0 and sF (x0)  2. Therefore, we obtain fi1; : : : ; img  '(x0).
Non-anonymity Let n  5. Consider ve distinct persons i1; i2; i3; j1; j2 2 N and a
nomination prole x 2 NN  such that sF (x) = 1, xi1 = i2, xi2 = i3, xi3 = i1, xj1 = j2,
and xj2 = j1. Then, since jfi 2 Fx : 9i0 2 N n fig; xi0 = i and xi = i0gj < n, xj2 = j1,
xj1 = j2, and sj2(x) = 1, we have j1 =2 '(x). Let x0i3 = xj2 = j1 and x0j2 = xi3 = i1. Then,
since sF (x
0
fi3;j2g; xNnfi3;j2g) = 1, x
0
i3
= j1, and xi2 = i3, we have j1 2 '(x0fi3;j2g; xNnfi3;j2g),
violating anonymity.
Example 3 Let ' be as in Example 3. We show that ' satises impartiality, anonymity,
and monotonicity, but not symmetry.
Impartiality Tamura and Ohseto (2014) show that ' satises impartiality.
Anonymity This is essentially the same with the case for the plurality with runners-up,
and we omit the proof.
Monotonicity For all x 2 NN  , all i1; : : : ; im 2 N , all j1; : : : ; jm 2 N , all x0j1 2 N nfj1g; : : :,
and all x0jm 2 N nfjmg, suppose that fi1; : : : ; img  '(x), xj1 ; : : : ; xjm =2 fi1; : : : ; img, and
x0j1 = i1; : : : ; x
0
jm
= im (here m = 1 or m = 2). Let x
0 = (x0fj1;:::;jmg; xNnfj1;:::;jmg). First,
consider the case that jFxj > 1. In this case, we have fi1; : : : ; img  Fx. If m = 1, then
we have Fx0 = fi1g, and thus fi1g  '(x0). If m = 2, assume without loss of generality
that i1 and i2 are the rst and the second members of Fx with xi2 = i1, respectively.
Then, we have Fx0 = fi1; i2g with i1 and i2 being the rst and the second members of Fx0 ,
respectively. Moreover, since xj1 ; xj2 =2 fi1g and xi2 = i1, we have i2 =2 fj1; j2g, implying
that x0i2 = xi2 = i1. Therefore, we obtain fi1; i2g  '(x0).
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Second, consider the case that jFxj = 1. If m = 1, we have either i1 2 Fx or i1 2 Sx
with sF (x)  sS(x) = 1. If the former, then we have Fx0 = fi1g, and thus fi1g  '(x0). If
the latter, i1 is the rst member of Sx nominating the unique member of Fx, say, k, and
i1 precedes k. Now, since Fx = fkg and sF (x)   sS(x) = 1, we have either Fx0 = fi1g (if
xj1 = k) or Fx0 = fi1; kg with i1 preceding k (if xj1 6= k). Therefore, in either case, we
obtain fi1g  '(x0). If m = 2, assume without loss of generality that Fx = fi1g, i2 2 Sx,
si1(x)   si2(x) = 1, xi2 = i1, and i2 precedes i1. Then, we have Fx0 = fi1g, Sx0 = fi2g,
si1(x
0)  si2(x0) = 1, and i2 precedes i1. Moreover, since xi2 = i1, we have x0i2 = i1. Hence,
we obtain fi1; i2g  '(x0).
Non-symmetry Obvious.
Example 4 Let ' be as in Example 4. We show that ' satises impartiality, anonymity,
symmetry, but not monotonicity.
Impartiality For all x 2 NN  and all i 2 N , suppose that i 2 '(x). Let x0i 6= xi. Note that
si(x
0
i; x i) = si(x). Then, if sF (x) = n   1, we have si(x) = 1, and thus si(x0i; x i) = 1.
Hence, we obtain i 2 '(x0i; x i). If sF (x) < n   1, we have si(x) = 1 or si(x) > 1.
If si(x) = 1, we have si(x
0
i; x i) = 1, and thus i 2 '(x0i; x i). If si(x) > 1, we have
si(x
0
i; x i) = si(x) > 1. Therefore, whether si(x) = sF (x) or si(x) < sF (x), we have
sF (x
0
i; x i) < n  1. Hence, we obtain i 2 '(x0i; x i).
Anonymity Obvious.
Symmetry Obvious.
Non-monotonicity Consider a nomination prole x 2 NN  such that si(x) = n 2 for some
i 2 N . Then, we have fig  '(x). Note that, since si(x) = n   2 < n   1, there exists
j 2 N n fig such that xj 6= i. Let x0j = i. Then, we have si(x0j ; x j) = n   1. Therefore,
we have i =2 '(x0j ; x j), violating monotonicity.
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